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What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? 
Evidence from Market Data
Jared A. Ellias
ABSTRACT
Over the past 30 years, the majority of large firms that filed for bankruptcy did so in the US 
bankruptcy courts of the Southern District of New York and Delaware. Some believe these ex-
perienced courts dominate because their expertise makes bankruptcy more predictable. Critics 
dispute this explanation, arguing instead that “predictability” is a cloak for the true, self- 
interested motivation of the debtor’s managers, lawyers, and senior creditors who influence 
the debtor’s choice of venue. In this paper, I look for evidence supporting the views of the 
proponents and detractors of bankruptcy forum shopping in a large sample of market data. My 
results suggest that the market is better at predicting the outcomes of bankruptcy cases in New 
York and Delaware, consistent with the hypothesis that the law there is more predictable. I do 
not find evidence supporting the view that those courts are biased in favor of senior creditors.
1. INTRODUCTION
When large firms file for bankruptcy, they tend to do so in the US Bank-
ruptcy Courts of the District of Delaware and the Southern District of 
New York. These two de facto national bankruptcy courts have jointly 
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overseen more than 60 percent of all large bankruptcy cases in the past 25 
years. While this equilibrium is now a well-entrenched feature of Amer-
ican bankruptcy law, it was not obvious that massive forum shopping 
would be the outcome when Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 103-394, 107 Stat. 4106). The new statute was flex-
ible, providing troubled businesses the choice of the bankruptcy court in 
their state of incorporation, any jurisdiction that is home to major assets, 
or the firm’s headquarters. However, as the act is federal law, the only 
advantages one jurisdiction might offer over another are geographic con-
venience, the body of judicially created precedent, and the quality and 
experience of the judges. The managers of large firms generally make the 
decision about bankruptcy venue in consultation with their lawyers and 
secured lenders. This paper is concerned with a much-debated question 
among academics and lawyers: why do these managers, lawyers, and 
lenders appear to prefer the bankruptcy process in two courts that are 
often far from a firm’s headquarters? What has driven a generation of 
bankruptcy forum shopping?
A voluminous literature offers distinctly different answers to these 
questions. The Senate Judiciary Committee recently asked the Govern-
ment Accountability Office to interview a large panel of bankruptcy law-
yers and ask what leads them to file for bankruptcy in one venue over an-
other (Government Accountability Office 2015). The lawyers’ responses 
echoed the arguments of academic forum-shopping proponents (for ex-
ample, Cole 2002; Ayotte and Skeel 2004; Skeel 2001), who hypothesize 
that firms are attracted to New York and Delaware because their com-
bination of judicial expertise and developed legal precedent makes the 
bankruptcy process more predictable and efficient. Critics strongly con-
test this narrative and argue that “predictability” is a code word that pro-
vides a cloak for the self-interest of lawyers, managers, and secured lend-
ers (LoPucki 2005). For example, a judge in Texas recently cast doubt on 
the value of judicial expertise, pointing out that the federal statute is the 
same in all jurisdictions. A better explanation, he implied, is geographic 
convenience for the East Coast lawyers and bankers who dominate cor-
porate bankruptcy practice (see In re Crosby Nat’l Golf Club, LLC, 534 
B.R. 888 [Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015], in which the judge argued that forum- 
shopping proponents’ explanations were “unconvincing”). Other critics 
see darker motives, alleging that managers and secured lenders prefer the 
destination courts because judges in those courts favor management and 
secured lenders at the expense of other stakeholders (LoPucki 2005).
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This paper comes to the question of bankruptcy forum shopping with 
a new methodology and a hand-collected data set of 285 large bankrupt 
companies linked to the trading-price records of 1,049 financial contracts. 
Forum-shopping critics argue that bankruptcy lawyers have reasons to 
disguise their true motivation, which makes it difficult to understand 
what explains the current equilibrium. I sidestep this bias by looking for 
evidence supporting the predictions of forum-shopping proponents and 
critics in theoretically unbiased market data. I focus primarily on the 
main claim of bankruptcy-forum-shopping proponents: that predictable 
law and judges drive forum shopping. In a well-functioning market, the 
prices of a bankrupt firm’s financial claims at the beginning of the bank-
ruptcy process incorporate a large quantity of information that amounts 
to an unbiased estimate of the outcome of the bankruptcy process and the 
future value of the firm. If the proponents of forum shopping are correct, 
we would expect the market to be better at predicting bankruptcy out-
comes in Delaware and the Southern District of New York than in other 
jurisdictions. Is it?
As firms are not randomly selected to different bankruptcy venues, I 
study the cross section of Chapter 11 debtors and look for evidence that 
supports the various theories that emerge from the bankruptcy- forum-
shopping literature.1 In my main results, I study squared investment re-
turns for a hypothetical trader who buys a claim against a Chapter 11 
debtor at the beginning of the bankruptcy process and receives the payoff 
at the end of the case. To illustrate the test statistic, consider a debtor 
who borrows $100 from a bank. When the company falls into distress, 
distressed investors often buy claims like this one from prebankruptcy 
creditors at a discount to the face value of the debt. In this example, sup-
pose the investor buys the claim for 50 cents on the dollar ($50) and 
receives a payoff at the end of the bankruptcy process equal to 60 cents 
on the dollar ($60). This investor earns a 20 percent return on her invest-
ment, or (60 − 50)/50 = 10/50 = .2. The squared return is .22 = .04. 
Importantly, if the investor sustains a 20 percent loss, the squared return 
would be −.22 = .04. Thus, the test statistic measures the absolute dis-
tance between the market’s expectations for recovery at the beginning of 
the bankruptcy process and the discounted present value of the ultimate 
bankruptcy payoff, which I call the pricing deviation. All else being equal, 
1. This paper is in the spirit of, for example, Barzuza and Smith (2014) and Daines 
(2001), which examine the cross section of Delaware-incorporated firms.
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a higher pricing deviation suggests that the market’s pricing assumptions 
are relatively less accurate.
My results generally support the view that the market is able to form 
more accurate recovery expectations for the firms that reorganize in the 
two destination jurisdictions. Using both ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and quantile regression, I find that filing in Delaware or New York is 
associated with a statistically significantly lower pricing deviation than 
in other bankruptcy venues. This relationship is robust to controlling for 
firm size and industry, the lawyers advising the debtor, the duration of 
the bankruptcy case, changes in market conditions over the bankruptcy 
period, prepackaged or prenegotiated filings, and other potential con-
founding variables. Importantly, as further discussed below, the evidence 
is more robust for Delaware, as the New York venue dummy is not statis-
tically significant in all specifications.
Unfortunately, an empirical research design that observes a selection 
process cannot eliminate the possibility that an omitted variable explains 
the results. I can, however, examine some of the more obvious confound-
ing variables. For example, the market may simply be better informed ex 
ante about the types of firms that reorganize in the destination courts. 
There does not appear to be an obvious reason why this would be true. 
The firms in the sample are large, and there are no obvious confound-
ing differences in the distribution of industries across the venue cohorts. 
Moreover, I examine a common proxy variable for market informedness 
in the literature—the rate of coverage by Wall Street research analysts—
and I do not find evidence of a pattern that would explain the results. 
Alternatively, the firms that reorganize in Delaware and New York could 
simply be inherently more predictable firms. I examine proxy variables 
for firm-specific uncertainty used in other research, specifically prebank-
ruptcy stock variance and cash-flow volatility, and I also do not find evi-
dence of a systematic difference across the venue cohorts.
I examine other evidence to see how well the predictability hypothesis 
fits the data. In theory, the influence of predictable law and legal prece-
dent should be strongest at the beginning of the bankruptcy process. As 
the firm moves through the process, the judge will issue the orders that 
should diminish uncertainty about the outcome, and the theoretical ben-
efit of ex ante predictability should diminish. Consistent with this the-
oretical expectation, the observed pricing advantage of New York and 
Delaware persists in the early part of the bankruptcy case but disappears 
in the data as the case advances deeper into the plan of reorganization 
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process and as the firm prepares to emerge from bankruptcy protection. 
The results suggest that the market’s observed advantage in pricing accu-
racy persists only during the period in which knowledge of the law and 
the judge would appear to matter the most.
In addition, I study the theoretical losers of increased predictability: 
holders of junior claims. As firms filing under Chapter 11 generally can-
not pay their debts in full, junior claims such as unsecured debt and  equity 
are often equivalent to out-of-the-money call options on the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate. Finance theory teaches us that call options are more 
valuable when underlying asset values are uncertain (see, for example, 
Merton 1974; Black and Cox 1976; Li 2013). Further, junior claim-
ants have incentives to reduce their expected losses and extract holdup 
payments by using litigation to impose costs and uncertainty on senior 
creditors. In theory, junior claims are worth less when uncertainty is 
lower, and the bargaining leverage that junior claimants expect to acquire 
through litigation might be reduced if the law has fewer ambiguities to 
exploit and the judge has the experience to filter weak claims. As theory 
suggests, I find that out-of-the-money claims of Delaware-venued bank-
rupt firms appear to be worth relatively less at the beginning of the Chap-
ter 11 process than claims of firms reorganizing in venues with less expe-
rienced courts, controlling for heterogeneity in capital structure, market 
conditions, and the ultimate payoff.2 Importantly, as further explained 
below, this does not appear to be the result of a transfer of value from 
senior creditors. However, I do not find evidence of the same relationship 
for the New York–venued sample.
In Section 4, I consider some of the predictions of detractors of forum 
shopping. I examine the market price of senior claims at the end of the 
bankruptcy process, and I do not find evidence that bankruptcy judges in 
the destination venues disproportionately approve plans of reorganiza-
tion that transfer value to senior creditors from junior claimants. Clearly, 
there are other channels through which a pro-secured-creditor bias (or a 
pro-management bias) could be expressed, and further research is needed. 
While this paper offers suggestive evidence supporting the views of the 
proponents of bankruptcy forum shopping, I cannot rule out the possi-
2. In the language of option-pricing theory, the value of the out-of-the-money claim 
theoretically increases in the volatility of the bankruptcy case. My results suggest that 
the greater certainty of more experienced courts effectively reduces the volatility of the 
bankruptcy case, and the pricing consequences appear to be consistent with what option- 
pricing theory would predict.
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bility that the predictions of both the proponents and detractors of forum 
shopping have merits. I also cannot say that the firms that reorganized 
elsewhere would have been better off filing for bankruptcy in a destina-
tion venue. The paper’s main conclusion is that the market appears to be 
better at predicting the outcome of the bankruptcy process in more expe-
rienced bankruptcy courts and that this correlation is robust to controls 
and supported by other evidence.
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the sample and 
provides summary statistics. Section 3 presents the research design and 
main results. Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of recurring pro-
posals in Congress to reform the bankruptcy statute and end forum shop-
ping. The results suggest that venue reform might increase the uncertainty 
of the bankruptcy system, at least in the short term, while the market 
adjusts.
2. THE SAMPLE
At a high level, my methodology tests how well the market predicts the 
outcome of the bankruptcy process. When large firms file for bankruptcy, 
their claims—both debt and equity—continue to trade in the market-
place.3 There is no readily available source that links the trading records 
of bankrupt firms to a data set of bankrupt companies. Accordingly, I 
compiled a large data set by hand. My final sample consists of 285 firms 
that filed for bankruptcy between 2001 and 2012 linked to the pricing 
records of 1,049 financial contracts, including bank debt, bonds, and 
 equity.4 One attribute of the sample worth noting is that it combines 
3. A secondary market also exists in the trade claims (the claims owed by the debtor 
to trade creditors, as opposed to financial creditors) of bankrupt firms (Ivashina, Iverson, 
and Smith 2016), but that trading market is thought to be relatively small compared with 
the much larger claims of financial creditors and is largely outside the scope of this paper.
4. My source for bond data goes back only to 2002, so I do not have bond pricing 
information for 2001, although many of the bonds for the 2001 sample enter the data set 
when the bankruptcy case advanced into 2002. The bond data were particularly challeng-
ing to study. I cleaned the data as described in Dick-Nielsen (2014), but there is no au-
thoritative list matching bond contracts to the unique bond identifiers such as Committee 
on Uniform Security Identification Procedures numbers. I relied on the Mergent Fixed In-
come Securities Database’s list of bonds to make my initial list of potential bond matches, 
but those data are very incomplete. For many bond contracts, I was able to identify the 
matching pricing record only after a significant investigation of the firm’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission disclosures. It is possible that a more complete list of bonds might 
identify more candidate firms for the sample, but none exists to the best of my knowledge.
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different types of pricing data: dealers’ quotes for corporate loans with 
records of actual trades for bonds and equity. To ensure that this does 
not bias the results, I check my main regression results on subsamples re-
stricted to loans, bonds, or equity. I provide detailed information about 
the sample’s construction and discuss the possibility of bias in greater de-
tail in the online appendix.
To the best of my knowledge, the sample contains all large compa-
nies that filed for bankruptcy reorganization during the sample period 
with debt that traded in public or private markets and for which prices 
could be observed.5 Importantly, the sample does not include firms that 
announced on their petition date that Chapter 11 would be a vehicle for 
a sale or liquidation (typically in a so-called Section 363 sale) outside of 
the statutory process for a plan of reorganization. The firms in my sample 
all announced on the petition date that Chapter 11 would be a vehicle for 
a business reorganization and that, if a sale was a possibility, it was not 
yet a certainty. I made this choice for three reasons. First, trading volume 
is significantly lower for firms that announce on the petition date that 
they plan to sell the firm, which suggests that the market for the claims 
of those firms may be different. There is, for example, less of a role for 
distressed hedge funds in bankruptcies in which the focus is on marketing 
the firm’s assets, and there are fewer conflicts over governance. Second, 
the theory assumes that the market’s theoretically improved ability to 
predict bankruptcy outcomes will be driven by knowledge of law, and the 
law surrounding the use of Section 363 to sell a firm’s assets is largely the 
same deferential standard in all jurisdictions. Third, some of the analyses 
below follow the firm through different parts of the bankruptcy process, 
and excluding firms that did not intend to go through the bankruptcy 
process from the overall sample provides for a more consistent sample.6
Table 1 summarizes the venues, and Table 2 provides summary sta-
tistics on the financial characteristics, industry, and public registration 
status of the sample’s firms. As Table 2 shows, Delaware and the non-
destination courts seem to administer similarly sized debtors, while the 
firms filing in the Southern District of New York are significantly larger, 
consistent with its status of venue of choice for the largest cases such as 
5. The online appendix discusses issues with missing data.
6. As further discussed below and shown in online appendix Table OA9, the results 
are qualitatively similar when the regression model with full controls is estimated over the 
full sample of claims including Section 363 cases, with additional dummy variables that 
capture aspects of the sales process.
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Lehman Brothers and General Motors. In addition, as Table 2 shows, the 
sample is relatively balanced in terms of industry between Delaware and 
the other courts, with Delaware administering slightly more cases involv-
ing manufacturing businesses.
For each firm in the data set, I gathered information about the under-
lying bankruptcy from the firm’s court docket. In addition to basic finan-
cial information, I identified the venue, the judge, the debtor’s law firm, 
and other information. I also identified important hearings and orders in 
the bankruptcy process and any objections filed by creditors to identify 
dates on which the judge’s actions would be particularly important.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
My research design is motivated by the possibility that more experi-
enced bankruptcy courts might make it easier for the market to predict 
the outcome of bankruptcy cases, which would improve observed price 
accuracy. If, as Cole (2002) suggests, bankruptcy law in Delaware (and 
New York) is more predictable than in less experienced courts, presum-
ably that might result in improvements in the market’s ability to price the 
claims of the bankrupt firms that reorganize in those venues. Investors, 
for example, will not have to weigh probabilities foreclosed by Delaware 
or New York precedent. They might be able to project the administrative 
costs of bankruptcy with greater certainty. The debtor’s case may present 
Table 1. Venues of Firms in the Sample
Bankruptcy Court Frequency %
Delaware 121 42.46
Southern District of New York 79 27.72
Northern District of Illinois 8 2.81
Northern District of Texas 6 2.11
Eastern District of Michigan 5 1.75
New Jersey 5 1.75
Nevada 5 1.75
Southern District of Texas 5 1.75
Northern District of Georgia 4 1.40
Southern District of Ohio 4 1.40
Othera 43 15.10
a Consists of 26 courts that handled three or fewer cases 
each.
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issues that were recently resolved by the same judge in a different case, 
which would allow the market to predict with greater certainty how the 
judge might rule. The intuition is that having a Delaware or New York 
bankruptcy filing as opposed to a St. Louis bankruptcy filing communi-
cates more information to the market, which results in improved observ-
able forecasting price efficiency.7 Thus, I introduce my hypothesis.
Hypothesis. All else being equal, the prices of claims of firms reorga-
nizing in Delaware and the Southern District of New York on the petition 
date should be closer to the ultimate bankruptcy payout than firms reor-
ganizing in venues with less experienced courts.
3.1. Research Design
To test the hypothesis directly, I calculate squared returns to measure 
pricing accuracy.8 At a high level, squared returns are simply the squared 
value of the traditional formula for calculating investment returns. More 
formally,
 r
p
pc
c c
c
2
2
=
−





,
bp
 
where rc
2  is the squared value of the buy-and-hold return of an inves-
tor who bought claim c at the beginning of the bankruptcy process and 
held it until receiving the bankruptcy payoff bpc. To reduce the likelihood 
that the results are biased by outlying pricing observations, I define pc 
as the weighted average transaction price of all observed trades in the 
30-day window around the filing of the bankruptcy petition.9 Similarly, 
the bankruptcy payoff bpc is the average trading price of all observed 
trades in the month around the confirmation of the plan of reorganiza-
tion. Throughout, I discount bpc to the present value as of the petition 
date to account for the time value of money.10
7. An untested assumption is that all of the other courts are the same. This could be 
wrong. There could be, for example, another jurisdiction (or judge) with a profile similar 
to Delaware’s or New York’s. I lack a theoretical basis to identify what court that might 
be, as there is no obvious third choice in the data.
8. As Table OA5 shows, the results are the same if I instead use the absolute value of 
an investment return as the test statistic.
9. I use the average price across all weighted trades in the trading window or the 
quoted price for my loan data. The trading window is defined as the 15 days prior to and 
the 15 days following the petition date. As Table OA6 shows, the results are qualitatively 
similar if I instead use windows of 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, or 10 days around the petition date.
10. I follow Li and Zhong (2013) and use the 1-year yield on treasury bonds as the 
risk-free rate. The results are not sensitive to different treasury bond maturities. In prac-
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Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990, p. 1465) suggest that the mar-
ket value of a claim against a bankrupt firm “should reflect the amount 
[claimholders] expected to receive upon reorganization, discounted to ac-
count for the expected delay in payment and adjusted for risk.” Stated 
more explicitly, in a frictionless market, the market price of claims at the 
beginning of the bankruptcy process should be equal to the discounted 
value of the expected bankruptcy payoff. This will usually be the pro-
ceeds of a sale or a claimant’s share of the value of the reorganized firm, 
with value in both cases distributed according to the absolute-priority 
rule. In a frictionless market, choice of venue should not help the mar-
ket predict the value of the claims at the end of the bankruptcy process. 
However, if I allow for bankruptcy costs and other frictions, the venue 
and the bankruptcy judge can impose uncertain costs in the forms of de-
lays and variations in courts’ decisions. This uncertainty could present 
itself as deviation from what one would expect in a frictionless market, 
which would reduce the accuracy of forecasts of future recoveries.
Thus, the test statistic aims to capture this pricing deviation, and it 
can be thought of as a measure of pricing accuracy.11 To illustrate, con-
sider an investor who purchases a claim for $10 that produces a dis-
counted payoff of $15. This investor receives a 50 percent return on her 
investment; rc
2  for this investor would be [(15 − 10)/10]2 = .52 = .25. 
Importantly, if this investor sustains a 50 percent loss, rc
2 for this inves-
tor would be [(5 − 10)/10]2 = −.52 = .25. In a frictionless and well- 
functioning market, the investor would sustain neither a gain nor a loss, 
and rc
2  would equal 0 since the payoff has been discounted to present 
value. Realistically, the market likely uses a different discount rate, so 
I would expect rc
2  to usually be larger than 0. As all values of rc
2  are 
positive, rc
2  measures the distance of the return from the ideal of perfect 
pricing accuracy.
The main advantage of this test statistic is that it facilitates straightfor-
ward interpretation of signed coefficients in a regression model. A vari-
tice, the risk-free rate of return (defined here as the 1-year yield on treasury bonds) is low 
enough during this period and the bankruptcy period is brief enough that there is very 
 little time value of money lost during most of the cases in the sample. For the specifica-
tions below that examine pricing at hearings later in the bankruptcy process, I discount 
the payoff to present value as of that important hearing date.
11. In a contemporaneous working paper that studies the accuracy of court-ordered 
valuations, Demiroglu, Franks, and Lewis (2015) use a similar test statistic, the absolute 
value between court valuations and subsequent market evidence. I adopt their terminol-
ogy of referring to that test statistic as measuring “error” and “deviation.”
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able that is negatively related to the pricing deviation implies that it is as-
sociated with the magnitude of that squared return being smaller, all else 
being equal, and that it is associated with more accurate pricing as of the 
petition date. Conversely, a positive coefficient implies less accurate pric-
ing. Table 3 summarizes the squared returns of the claims that are traded 
at the beginning of the Chapter 11 process.
Two important patterns emerge from Table 3. First, attributes of the 
financial contract, such as a claim’s priority, appear to be important. For 
example, predictably, secured claims appear to be priced relatively more 
accurately than unsecured claims and equity.12 Table 2 summarizes some 
aspects of the capital structures of the firms in the sample, and there do 
not appear to be enormous differences in ex ante capital structures when 
sorted by venue. However, Table 3 demonstrates that it is important to 
control for observable attributes of the financial claims to test the hy-
pothesis. Second, Table 3 shows that the means and medians are very 
12. In the specifications below, I generalize financial contracts with variables that 
measure relative seniority (through the percentage of the capital structure senior to the 
claim) and collateral. I do not follow the traditional approach in the literature of using 
dummy variables for characteristics of claims like security and seniority because my ap-
proach appears to be more precise, and introducing additional dummy variables would 
raise problems of multicollinearity. The results are similar if I rely on dummy variables 
instead, as Table OA7 shows. In building the sample, I analyzed the capital structure at 
the contract level, which provides for a more generalizable set of control variables than 
in previous work.
Table 3. Pricing Deviation
N Mean Median SD
Venue:
 All claims 1,049 1.64 .08 8.09
 Delaware 378 2.29 .09 10.38
 Southern District of New York 403 1.45 .08 5.59
 Other 268 .98 .07 7.55
Type of claim:
 All secured claims 514 .53 .01 3.24
 First-lien secured claim 205 .23 .01 .93
 Second-lien secured claim 47 .61 .1 1.71
 Secured claim with lien on specific asset 163 1.14 .03 5.54
 All unsecured claims 343 3.37 .39 11.62
 Senior unsecured bonds 218 2.73 .48 6.57
 Subordinated unsecured bonds 64 5.18 .25 20.9
 Equity 137 1.78 .65 10.6
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different, which points to the wide dispersion in the data and the need to 
account for outliers that could bias the results.13
 Accordingly, I account for the problem of outliers in the sample in 
two ways. First, I trim the outlying 2 percent of observations from the 
results to assure that no observed relationship is unduly influenced by 
outlying observations. The results are qualitatively similar if I analyze the 
full sample, which suggests that outliers are not a substantial driver of the 
results.14 Second, I use estimation methods that are more robust to out-
liers. In particular, I follow Billett et al. (2015), which confronts the same 
problem of skewed debt returns and supplements OLS models with quan-
tile regression models. Quantile regression models estimate the condi-
tional median of the observed sample, as opposed to OLS models, which 
estimate the conditional mean. As Billett et al. (2015) explain, quantile 
regression models are often used to test the robustness of OLS results be-
cause they are less sensitive to the presence of outliers.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Baseline Price Accuracy Result. My basic model of the pricing de-
viation for each observed claim c is
 2(1) ln( )   Delaware  SDNY  Controls .c c c cr a b b d e= + + + +  (1)
The dependent variable rc
2  is the observed pricing deviation, Delawarec 
and SDNYc are dummy variables for the venue in which the claim is be-
ing reorganized, and Controlsc is a vector of variables that account for 
other possible determinants of ,rc
2  some relating to observable charac-
teristics of firms and claims and others capturing elements of the bargain-
ing environment.
A potential bias could be imparted by the fact that my unit of ob-
servation is the financial contract issued by each debtor in the sample. 
While some debtors have one contract traded at different levels of claim 
13. Importantly, as I show in Table OA8, I use one- and two-sided t-tests to study the 
distribution of petition date prices across the three venue cohorts of firms, and I fail to 
find statistically significant differences that the samples’ prices are drawn from different 
distributions.
14. When the models specified in Table 4 are estimated instead over the full sample 
using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression, the Delaware and New 
York venue dummies remain negatively and statistically significantly associated with the 
pricing deviation with full control variables, and the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
similar. Table OA9 shows the regression results on the full sample of claims, including 
outliers (models 1 and 2) and cases in which management announced the intention to use 
Chapter 11 to conduct an auction on the first day of the bankruptcy case, chiefly through 
a Section 363 sale (models 3 and 4).
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priority (for example, a secured term loan, a senior unsecured bond, and 
a subordinated bond), other debtors have multiple contracts trading with 
the same level of priority. For example, an industrial firm might have 
borrowed money by issuing several unsecured bonds with different matu-
rity dates, which bankruptcy law converts into unsecured claims of equal 
priority. To avoid allowing this to bias the sample, I calculate a single 
value for rc
2  for every level of payment priority against each firm in the 
sample. So, in the case of an industrial firm with multiple unsecured bond 
contracts outstanding, I take the mean trading price of all traded bond 
claims within the applicable trading window and include it in the regres-
sion sample as a single observation.15
Table 4 presents estimates of the relationship between bankruptcy 
venue and pricing accuracy using different estimation methods. In model 
1, I use OLS regression with fixed effects for industry and year on the 
pricing deviation and find a negative and statistically significant associ-
ation for the Delaware venue dummy. In model 2, I include plausibly 
exogenous controls such as firm size and claim and capital structure vari-
ables. In this model, the New York venue dummy variable becomes neg-
atively and statistically significantly associated with the observed pric-
ing deviation. In Table OA10 of the online appendix, I verify that only 
one additional control variable—the amount of debt owed by the firm, a 
proxy for firm size—is needed to reveal the observed negative association 
between the New York venue dummy and the pricing deviation.
It is possible that these results might be driven by differences in the 
distribution of financial contracts across the bankruptcy venues.16 To try 
to control for those differences, I employ three additional control vari-
ables. First, I control for the claim’s relative position in the capital struc-
ture by calculating the percentage of the debt capital structure that has a 
higher priority than the claim.17 This number ranges from 0 (generally, 
for senior debt claims) to 1 (for equity). I also control for whether the 
15. As models 5 and 6 of Table OA9 show, the results are the same if I use financial 
contracts as the unit of analysis instead of one observation per traded claim with a com-
mon level of priority against the debtor.
16. Table OA11 summarizes the distribution of types of financial contracts in the re-
gression sample.
17. In Table OA12, I look for evidence that the influence of Delaware or New York 
law might increase (or decrease) in the relative seniority of the claim. I add interaction 
terms for the capital structure variables (percentage of capital structure senior to the claim 
and the dummy for lien on a specific asset) and the venue dummies to the models in Table 
3, and the resulting interaction terms are not statistically significant. This result does not 
support the view that the influence of Delaware or New York law increases or decreases 
in the relative seniority of the claim.
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contract gave the creditor a lien on one of the firm’s assets, such as real 
estate, inventory, a plant, or an airplane, which might be associated with 
a higher recovery rate than a lien that relies on more nebulous going- 
concern value.18
In model 3, I add additional control variables to test the robustness 
of the result. Bankrupt firms file for Chapter 11 with different levels of 
readiness to proceed through the bankruptcy process. In a prepackaged 
bankruptcy, management has reached an agreement with all of its cred-
itors and has already solicited a vote on the plan of reorganization. In a 
prenegotiated bankruptcy, management has reached an agreement with 
some, but perhaps not all, of its creditors, and no vote has been solic-
ited. I also control for the squared return of firms in the same industry 
over the bankruptcy period, the length of the bankruptcy case, and the 
debtor’s law firm.19 As models 1–3 show, after controlling for these addi-
tional characteristics of the underlying business, the bankruptcy, and the 
financial contract, the market appears to price the claims of debtors re-
organizing in the two experienced bankruptcy courts more accurately. In 
models 4–6, I reestimate the same models using quantile regression, and 
the results are similar.
As a further robustness check, I estimate the OLS regression model on 
subsamples of the data and with alternative control variables, and Table 
5 shows those results. In models 1, 2, and 3, I estimate the full model 
(without the capital structure variables) on the bond, equity, and loan 
data, respectively. The Delaware dummy is negative and statistically sig-
nificantly associated with the pricing deviation in these subsamples, but 
the New York–venue dummy is statistically significant only when analyz-
ing the cross section of bond claims. In models 4 and 5, I use alternative 
control variables for firm size: prebankruptcy earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and EBITDA-to-debt 
 ratio, and the results remain similar to those in Table 4.
In sum, I find a persistent and statistically significant negative relation 
18. I analyzed the capital structure of each sample thoroughly, so this variable in-
cludes cases in which the creditor has a claim against a subsidiary corporation with one of 
the firm’s assets (that is, the land for a case involving a hotel) and cases in which the loan 
was structured by conveying a lien on a specific asset to the lender.
19. I control for law firm because the market’s knowledge of the debtor’s law firm (for 
example, familiarity with the tendencies and biases of particular law firms or their work 
in other bankruptcies) might help the market form more accurate expectations about re-
covery. Conversely, outcomes for an unknown firm might be harder for the market to 
predict.
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Table 5. Robustness Tests of Determinants of the Pricing Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Delaware −1.443* −1.207* −1.245* −1.863* −1.985*
(.655) (.607) (.620) (.806) (.849)
SDNY −1.386* −.654 −.550 −1.636* −1.812*
(.548) (.532) (.640) (.811) (.843)
Prepackaged bankruptcy −4.916** .363 −5.144** −.463 −.537
(1.051) (1.034) (.822) (1.667) (1.675)
Prenegotiated bankruptcy −1.607** 1.494+ −1.436* −.375 −.420
(.465) (.800) (.600) (.988) (.990)
Lien on specific asset −1.870* 1.320+ −2.959* −2.951*
(.904) (.764) (1.182) (1.189)
Private equity owned −.603 −.161 −1.570+ −1.600+
(.679) (.515) (.926) (.935)
Log squared return of 
comparable firms .008 .043 .058+ .018 .014
(.024) (.039) (.031) (.042) (.041)
Log EBITDA .230 .334
(.265) (.262)
% Firm capital structure 
senior to claimant 2.941** 2.916**
(.596) (.599)
Log observed case duration 1.641* 1.525*
(.691) (.678)
Log EBITDA-to-debt ratio −.400
(.450)
R2 .53 .40 .36 .45 .45
N 348 128 444 256 256
Debtors 140 128 185 108 108
Sample Bonds Equity Loans PACER PACER
Note. Results are from ordinary least squares regressions, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged squared return that 
an investor who bought the claim on the petition date would have realized if she had sold 
the claim at the end of the bankruptcy process, based on the observed market value of the 
claim. The bankruptcy payoff is discounted to present value as of the petition date. The 
bonds sample includes all bonds in the data set, the equity sample includes all common 
equity, and the loans sample includes all secured loans. The Public Access to Court Elec-
tronic Records (PACER) sample is the sample of claims with full PACER data (generally, 
cases filing for bankruptcy in 2004 or later) that disclosed prebankruptcy earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) or for which it could be ob-
tained from contemporaneous filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All 
regressions include industry (Fama-French 38-industry classifications), year, and law firm 
fixed effects.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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between reorganizing in the two experienced bankruptcy courts and the 
observed pricing deviation. Stated differently, the market appears to be 
better at predicting the ultimate value of the claims of firms reorganizing 
in more experienced bankruptcy courts, although the relationship is more 
robust for the Delaware-venued sample of claims than for the New York 
sample.20
3.2.2. The Challenge of Omitted-Variable Bias. It is important to qual-
ify these results by returning to the limitations of the research design. 
The cross-sectional results suggest that the market can better predict 
the outcome of the bankruptcy process when firms reorganize in more 
experienced courts. However, the research design does not allow for a 
strong causal claim, as the firms that file for bankruptcy in Delaware or 
New York do not do so randomly. There could be an omitted variable 
that drives the results.21 Ideally, I would test the hypothesis by randomly 
transferring firms that filed for bankruptcy in the destination courts to 
less popular jurisdictions and randomly transferring firms from less ex-
perienced courts to the destination venues.22 Virtually every firm could 
reach a destination court with a creative bankruptcy lawyer, even if it had 
minimal contacts prior to bankruptcy.23
The most obvious possible confounding issue is that the market  simply 
knows more about the cohorts of firms that file for bankruptcy in New 
York and Delaware than the firms that file elsewhere. The accounting lit-
erature refers to the level of knowledge that the market has about a firm 
20. In Table OA13, I show that the results are qualitatively similar if I omit the cases 
in which unsecured creditors prosecuted significant avoidance actions, which suggests 
that the differential distribution of claims subject to avoidance is not what appears to 
drive the results in Table 3.
21. LoPucki and Doherty (2002) examine a sample of public company bankruptcies 
from 1991 through 1996 and conclude that their cohort of firms filing for bankruptcy in 
Delaware was not different, on the basis of observable financial characteristics, from the 
cohorts filing in other venues.
22. The sample does contain four cases in which a judge in Delaware or New York 
granted a creditor’s motion filed early in the bankruptcy case transferring the case to a 
less experienced court. The moving party was never a financial creditor—it was the US 
trustee, arguing that venue was improper; a government official; or a union that wanted 
the firm to reorganize in a venue closer to home. While caution is advised in interpreting 
the trading activity surrounding these nonrandomly selected transfers, the average pricing 
deviation of the claims of those firms appears to have increased 1.3 percent when compar-
ing the day after the transfer order with the day before it.
23. Patriot Coal, for example, created new New York–domiciled subsidiaries with 
minimal assets to use as a basis for filing for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New 
York. These subsidiaries were created essentially on the eve of bankruptcy.
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as market informedness. There do not appear to be any obvious reasons 
why market informedness would differ across the three cohorts of firms. 
As Table 2 shows, the majority of firms filing for bankruptcy in Delaware 
(83 percent), the Southern District of New York (86 percent), and the 
less experienced courts (89 percent) were registered public filers with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to bankruptcy. Further, 
continued compliance with SEC disclosure obligations does not appear to 
correlate with venue. For the Delaware cohort, 35 percent of firms con-
tinue to file SEC disclosures for the year preceding bankruptcy, as com-
pared with 39 percent of the Southern District of New York cohort and 
36 percent of the cohort of other courts.
A common approach to market informedness in the literature is to 
examine proxy variables, such as the number of Wall Street analysts 
covering the firm (see, for example, Chae 2005). Research analysts ex-
pend resources producing detailed reports on firms, which leads many to 
believe that firms covered by research analysts will have more accurate 
prices. To investigate the distribution of coverage by analysts across the 
three cohorts of firms, I examine the historic data on such coverage from 
the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System to see if it systematically  varies 
across the three cohorts of firms.24 I find that analysts appear to cover 
about 40 percent of the sample’s firms in the year prior to bankruptcy, 
with the rate of coverage being significantly higher in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York (49 percent of firms) than in Delaware (36 percent) 
or the cohort of other courts (32 percent). Similarly, the median number 
of analysts covering New York–venued debtors is higher (4.5) than that 
covering firms that filed for bankruptcy in Delaware (2) or in the less 
experienced bankruptcy courts (3). Overall, the results suggest that the 
relatively larger firms that choose to reorganize in New York are better 
covered by analysts but that there is no statistically significant difference 
in the rate of coverage or the number of analysts covering the similarly 
sized firms that file for bankruptcy in Delaware or in other courts.25
Alternatively, some researchers have used the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for the level of information in the market. The bid-ask spread is 
the difference between the offers to buy a claim in the marketplace (the 
24. Table OA14 shows these results.
25. As Table OA14 shows, the results are qualitatively similar if I examine the mean 
number of analysts instead of the median or if I use the year of the bankruptcy petition 
instead of the year prior to bankruptcy. In addition, Table OA15 shows that the results in 
Table 3 do not change if I include an analyst-coverage control variable in the regression 
models.
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bid) as compared with the offers to sell the claim (the ask). Some portion 
of the bid-ask spread is thought to reflect informational asymmetry be-
tween informed and uninformed traders, as uninformed traders demand 
a risk premium when they are at an informational disadvantage. Some 
research shows that reforms like accounting disclosures that increase the 
informedness level of the market reduce bid-ask spreads (for example, 
Greenstein and Sami 1994), which suggests that a higher bid-ask spread 
might indirectly reflect a marketplace that is less well-informed and higher 
informational asymmetry between traders. In Table OA16, I examine the 
observed bid-ask spread for the Loan Syndications and Trading Associ-
ation loan data and estimated bid-ask spreads for the bond and equity 
data prior to bankruptcy filing, and I do not find evidence suggesting that 
the market is systematically less well-informed about the underlying busi-
nesses of the firms reorganizing in less experienced courts.26
However, none of this indirect evidence of market informedness bears 
squarely on another potential confounding variable: the level of firm- 
specific uncertainty. It may be the case that the market is equally well- 
informed about all three groups of firms, but the value of firms reorga-
nizing in less experienced courts could be more uncertain than that of 
firms reorganizing in Delaware or New York for reasons that have noth-
ing to do with bankruptcy law or the experience of the judges and are not 
other wise captured by the control variables in Table 4. If the uncertainty 
surrounding the value of a firm is greater, the market will have a more 
difficult time forming accurate expectations about recovery from bank-
ruptcy. Unfortunately, uncertainty, like market informedness, cannot be 
observed directly.
Accordingly, I use two methods from the literature to examine the 
possibility that the uncertainty regarding the three cohorts of firms is dif-
ferent. First, Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) proxy for firm-specific un-
certainty by measuring the variance of the firm’s publicly traded common 
stock returns. I follow their methodology and examine the variance of 
the firms with public equity that trade actively in the week, month, year, 
and 2 years prior to bankruptcy. As Table OA17 shows, I do not find ev-
idence of a systematic difference between the three groups of firms. Cash-
flow volatility is an alternative measure of uncertainty. I follow Rountree, 
Weston, and Allayannis (2008) and use the standard deviation of firms’ 
revenue, scaled by their assets, as a proxy for cash-flow volatility. I am 
26. I estimate the bid-ask spread for the bond and equity data using the method in 
Corwin and Schultz (2012).
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able to calculate the prebankruptcy cash-flow volatility for the firms that 
continued to file disclosures with the SEC that covered the year prior to 
bankruptcy. As Table OA18 shows, this proxy also does not indicate any 
reason to worry that the three cohorts of firms are somehow different in 
an unobserved way.
3.2.3. Pricing Accuracy through the Bankruptcy Process. Beyond the main 
results, I look for additional evidence consistent with the view that pre-
dictability drives the market’s observed advantage in pricing accuracy for 
New York– and Delaware-venued debtors. If the correlation documented 
above does, in fact, reflect the impact of predictable law and courts, we 
might expect that relationship to disappear as the firm moves through 
bankruptcy. Chapter 11 is a structured bargaining process, and manage-
ment negotiates with creditors against the backdrop of intermediate ju-
dicial orders. Uncertainty in the case resolves as the case moves forward. 
To examine how uncertainty might change over the case’s duration, I cal-
culate the pricing deviation for each cohort at three additional points in 
the bankruptcy process: the date the judge approves debtor-in-possession 
financing, the date the disclosure statement for the restructuring trans-
action is approved, and the date the plan is confirmed. Figure 1 shows 
the regression coefficients for the Delaware and Southern District of New 
York venues from estimating model 2 in Table 4 using the observed pric-
ing deviation on these important hearing dates.
As Figure 1 shows, the lower pricing deviations in the more experi-
enced courts persist through the approval of the financing motion and 
disappear from the data by the time the disclosure statement is approved. 
This suggests the observed pricing advantage at the beginning of the pro-
cess might in fact be due to the ex ante predictability of the destination 
jurisdictions—something that becomes less important as the judge is-
sues the decisions that the market had anticipated. However, as Table 
OA19 shows, I find that some of the capital structure variables in  Table 4 
maintain their statistical significance and sign throughout the entire 
bankruptcy process, which suggests that I am not merely finding that the 
model loses all of its predictive power once a bankruptcy case draws close 
to the end.
As an additional check, I calculate prebankruptcy pricing deviations 
to see whether the market is also better at predicting the ultimate bank-
ruptcy payoff of the New York– and Delaware-venued cohorts of firms 
This content downloaded from 209.129.089.025 on June 10, 2019 13:48:18 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Figure 1. Pricing deviation and the (A) Delaware and (B) Southern District of New York 
venues.
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prior to any bankruptcy filing.27 Table OA20 shows that the relationship 
that appears at the beginning of the bankruptcy process does not appear 
in the data for Delaware until the petition date. On the other hand, the 
pricing deviation for the Southern District of New York becomes statis-
tically significantly easier for the market to predict 30 days before bank-
ruptcy, although the effect does not appear to be statistically significantly 
different from 0 earlier in the data. I hypothesize that this may be due 
to the market anticipating that this relatively larger cohort of firms will 
choose New York as their bankruptcy venue, while the market may not 
yet be able to predict with certainty where the eventual Delaware-venued 
cohort will choose to file. In any event, my failure to find a statistically 
significant relationship for either cohort until the eve of bankruptcy pro-
vides further comfort that these firms are not simply easier for the market 
to understand before bankruptcy law plays a role in the market’s pricing 
model.
In sum, the results suggest that the market’s understanding of how 
the bankruptcy might proceed improves after a Delaware or New York 
bankruptcy filing. The rich body of precedent in Delaware and New York 
appears to assist the market when bankruptcy law matters the most—the 
time between bankruptcy filing and the approval of a disclosure state-
ment. This is consistent with the theoretical role that predictable law 
might play in assisting the market in pricing and is supportive of the 
views of bankruptcy-forum-shopping proponents.
3.2.4. Predictable Courts and Out-of-the-Money Options. Finance theory 
teaches that claims against Chapter 11 debtors can be thought of as Eu-
ropean call options on the bankruptcy estate (Merton 1974). Because the 
typical Chapter 11 debtor is balance-sheet insolvent at filing (that is, the 
value of its assets is lower than the face value of its claims), junior claim-
ants such as shareholders or unsecured creditors often find themselves 
27. Caution is advised in interpreting these results for at least three reasons. First, 
the model uses control variables that may not have been public knowledge or may not 
be constant over the prebankruptcy period. Second, the model assumes that the market 
is pricing the claims prior to bankruptcy in terms of their discounted bankruptcy payoff, 
which may be a less apt choice for some firms than for others. Third, there is no way to 
know when the market became aware that bankruptcy was immediately imminent or 
what the venue would be, and there could be a systematic difference across venues or 
over time that is not otherwise captured by control variables. This makes the estimates for 
the periods closest to bankruptcy especially unreliable, because there may be unobserved 
heterogeneity in venue-selection knowledge—for example, the market may simply assume 
that the largest firms will choose the Southern District of New York.
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holding the equivalent of out-of-the-money call options. If the firm’s 
value were to increase during the bankruptcy case, it is possible that the 
claim would come back into the money. Junior claimants benefit from a 
higher level of value uncertainty, as a higher level of uncertainty implies a 
greater chance that junior claims will come back in the money.
Importantly, junior claimants can also engage in strategic litiga-
tion to both prolong the bankruptcy process, which also increases op-
tion value, and inflict risk and uncertainty on senior creditors to extract 
holdup- value settlements (Ayotte and Morrison 2009; Ellias 2016). Thus, 
 junior claimants can lose value from increased certainty.28 Consequently, 
I hypothesize that junior claimants of Delaware- and New York–venued 
firms might trade at a lower value that reflects reduced option value, con-
trolling for the ultimate bankruptcy payoff.
To test this, I study a group of deeply out-of-the-money claims with 
a senior claimant holding a blanket lien trading at less than 75 cents on 
the dollar on the petition date.29 On the basis of the aggregate market 
value of senior claims, the median claim would require the firm’s market 
value to increase by $72 million for the junior claimant to come into the 
money, and the largest junior claimant in this subsample is more than 
$473 million out of the money.
Table 6 shows the determinants of the price of the out-of-the-money 
claim on the petition date. In model 2, I control for firm size, whether the 
case was prepackaged or prenegotiated, and whether the claim is equity, 
and I add additional control variables in model 3. In model 4, I control 
for the discounted present value of the ultimate bankruptcy payoff. I also 
calculate the difference between the market value of all senior claims and 
the face amount of those claims, which proxies for how much the value 
of the firm would have to improve for the junior claimant to receive a 
distribution pursuant to the absolute-priority rule. The coefficient of this 
control variable takes on the expected negative relationship, which sug-
gests that claims trade at a relatively lower value the more out of the 
28. In a similar setting, Mirvis (2007) argues that shareholder class-action plaintiffs 
choose to file complaints in venues with less experienced courts (as opposed to Delaware’s 
Chancery Court, which adjudicates many such disputes) because the greater variation in 
possible outcomes creates settlement leverage.
29. I identify my sample of out-of-the-money claims by using the price of senior 
claims, as the firm’s prebankruptcy capital structure is endogenous and likely reflects in-
vestors’ prebankruptcy assumptions about what the firm might be worth in bad states of 
the world. As Table OA21 shows, the results are the same if I use a deeper discount—any-
thing up to 55 cents—as the boundary for identifying out-of-the-money claims. The re-
sults disappear as the sample becomes significantly smaller at lower boundary conditions.
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Table 6. Determinants of Out-of-the-Money Prices on the Petition Date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Delaware −.125 −.605* −.586* −.600* −.616*
(.463) (.272) (.272) (.270) (.276)
SDNY .596 .220 −.164 −.179 −.176
(.533) (.300) (.270) (.251) (.277)
Log funded debt −.114 −.146* .520** .428*
(.073) (.073) (.161) (.173)
Prepackaged bankruptcy −.512 −.360 −.315 −.430
(.563) (.415) (.435) (.531)
Prenegotiated bankruptcy −.126 .125 .072 .056
(.241) (.191) (.191) (.206)
Equity claim −4.099** −2.111** −1.867** −1.807**
(.221) (.376) (.342) (.331)
Log PV bankruptcy payoff .369** .381**
(.063) (.063)
Log distance to money −.626** −.629**
(.146) (.158)
Log days of bankruptcy .140
(.111)
Log return of industry-
comparable firms −.866
(1.063)
R2 .02 .66 .81 .81 .82
N 260 260 260 255 231
Debtors 148 148 148 146 131
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Law firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Note. Results are from ordinary least squares regressions, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged price of a junior 
claim that appears to be out of the money, as indicated by an observed senior claim trad-
ing at 75 cents on the dollar or less. The log PV bankruptcy payoff is the logged market 
value of the bankruptcy payoff, discounted to present value. The log distance to money is 
the logged difference between the face amount of the firm’s liabilities and the market value 
of those financial claims on the petition date. The log days of bankruptcy are the logged 
days elapsed between the petition date and the date the assets leave bankruptcy court ad-
ministration (the effective date of a plan). The log return of industry-comparable firms is 
the market-weighted return an investor would have received if she had bought the publicly 
traded group of stocks in the bankrupt firm’s four-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
code on the petition date and sold it at the conclusion of the bankruptcy process. 
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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money they are. In model 5, I control for the length of the bankruptcy 
case and the weighted return of firms in the same industry over the bank-
ruptcy period, and the results are the same.30
This analysis produces mixed results. While the Delaware dummy is 
persistently and negatively associated with the dependent variable once 
control variables are introduced, the New York venue dummy is not. I 
hypothesize that the raw experience level in Delaware—which receives 
almost twice as many large filings as New York with a smaller bench—
might make a difference. Overall, the observed relationship for Delaware 
is consistent with the view that judicial experience might be associated 
with reduced option value for out-of-the-money claims.
3.2.5. Evidence of Bias toward Senior Lenders. Critics of bankruptcy fo-
rum shopping charge that regulatory competition has led judges to be 
overly deferential to managers and secured lenders and perhaps biased in 
their favor. This is a difficult claim to evaluate empirically, if for no other 
reason than the finding of LoPucki (2005) that some of the negative be-
havior associated only with Delaware and New York in the 1990s spread 
nationally in the early 2000s as other courts struggled to compete for 
cases involving large debtors. Thus, one might expect that there would be 
little variation associated with proxies for bias during the sample period 
of entrenched forum shopping. However, some data may help inform this 
debate.
One potential channel through which a pro-senior-creditor bias might 
be expressed is a transfer of value from junior claimants to senior cred-
itors. To test whether Delaware and New York are venues for value ex-
traction, I consider how often I observe a claimant being paid more than 
in full—when a debt claim is trading above 100 cents on the dollar at the 
end of the bankruptcy process. The absolute-priority rule says that no 
creditor should be paid more than in full, and if creditors are systemat-
ically being paid more than 100 cents on each dollar they are owed in a 
destination venue, it could be evidence of bias in favor of the secured lend-
ers that often influence the venue decision.31 Table 7 displays the percent-
age of claims being paid more than in full at various measurement levels. 
The results suggest that senior creditors receive more than full repayment 
30. As Table OA22 shows, results are also the same if I include a dummy variable for 
the cases in which management prosecuted avoidance actions.
31. Some of these observations might be false positives, as an oversecured creditor 
could be paid accrued interest that would look like an overpayment given the naive test 
statistic.
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more often in the venues with less experienced courts, but the difference 
between the three cohorts is slight, and, in any case, there is no evidence 
of a systematic pro-senior-creditor bias in the destination  venues.
These results must be qualified because they rely on observed behav-
ior. If regulatory competition causes the less experienced courts to be-
come just as deferential and biased, we would not expect to find any 
observable evidence of bias in the cross section. In addition, it is very 
possible that some restructuring transactions favor one group of creditors 
over others—for example, a secured-creditor-driven fire sale (see, for ex-
ample, Ayotte and Morrison 2009)—and market data may not fully re-
flect any value redistributed through transaction choice.32 Clearly, further 
research is needed on the question of deference, but an analysis of some 
of the data in the sample does not produce evidence of a judicial bias in 
favor of managers or senior creditors.
4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This paper examines a cohort of firms that filed for bankruptcy in the era 
after Delaware and New York came to dominate the market. The results 
raise the possibility that the bankruptcy process in those two courts is 
now observably more predictable than that in other jurisdictions, which 
might provide important theoretical benefits to distressed firms. For ex-
ample, settling important legal issues might be easier if the parties are 
32. Other research finds evidence that senior creditors can use their bargaining power 
to pursue their own goals (for example, Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback 2000; Baird and 
Rasmussen 2002; Ayotte and Morrison 2009; Jenkins and Smith 2014), which some-
times includes forcing inefficient liquidation, although other work argues that the ability 
of secured creditors to force inefficient liquidations is overstated (for example, Westbrook 
2015).
Table 7. Percentage of Debt Claims Paid More than in Full
Delaware
Southern 
District of  
New York Other
≥100 .09 .18 .19
≥105 .03 .08 .10
≥110 .02 .04 .05
≥115 .02 .02 .05
Note. Results are based on the observed market value at 
the end of the bankruptcy process.
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able to collectively predict how the judge might rule. Lenders may feel 
more comfortable providing debtor-in-possession financing if they feel 
more confident they can predict that their rights will be upheld (Bae and 
Goyal 2009). Further, lawyers may find it easier to advise their clients 
and set expectations in a more seasoned jurisdiction.
This paper’s conclusions are qualified by the limitations of the re-
search design. The results suggest that the market appears to be able to 
better predict the outcome of the bankruptcy process for firms that file in 
Delaware and New York than for firms that file in less seasoned venues. 
This remains true after controlling for the firm’s size, industry, law firm, 
changes in market conditions, and other observable characteristics. How-
ever, I cannot eliminate the possibility that these same firms would have 
similarly predictable bankruptcies elsewhere. One might speculate, for ex-
ample, that the Chicago-based law firm that represented Tribune  Media 
in its bankruptcy would not choose the geographic inconvenience of Del-
aware over the Northern District of Illinois if all else would otherwise be 
equal, but this research design cannot answer that question directly.
I also cannot say for certain whether transferring the 40 percent of 
firms that reorganize in less seasoned venues to the destination courts 
would make their reorganizations more predictable. It may be that the 
reason those firms did not file in a destination court to begin with is that 
their particular legal issues would not benefit from the store of precedent 
or expertise in those jurisdictions, and future research should investigate 
this possibility. Future research should continue to investigate why some 
firms choose destination courts and others stay closer to home.
Further, the results are more robust for Delaware than New York. 
I hypothesize that this might be true for two reasons. First, it may very 
well be that New York’s cohort of firms—larger and more complex, on 
average—is different from the other two cohorts of firms in unobserved 
ways. There may be more new legal issues in megabankruptcies like Gen-
eral Motors and Lehman Brothers, for example, than there are in other 
cases. Both firms could have filed for bankruptcy in Delaware but chose 
New York instead, presumably for a reason that this study did not un-
cover. Legal precedent may be less useful for the truly unique issues that 
New York’s larger cases bring to court. Second, there may be a difference 
in court cultures in Delaware and New York that make New York less 
predictable. Future research should compare Delaware and New York in 
greater detail and especially investigate the determinants of selection be-
tween the two venues.
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With all of that said, the results of this paper support the view that the 
bankruptcy bar’s forum-shopping experiment might have decreased the 
uncertainty associated with the bankruptcy process by speeding up the 
process of judicial interpretation of statutory ambiguities and building 
concentrated benches of experienced judges. The result of this may be, 
in effect, the minimization of the aggregate transaction costs created by 
the bankruptcy statute, a benefit that could plausibly impact the cost of 
capital of large firms more generally. One puzzle that arises from these 
results is that out-of-the-money constituencies appear to fare worse in 
Delaware in particular, yet one seldom observes junior constituencies us-
ing involuntary bankruptcy petitions to force companies into bankruptcy 
elsewhere or filing motions to transfer venue. The results suggest that 
the value of an out-of-the-money claim increases in the legal volatility of 
the court, and most large firms could be pushed into bankruptcy in inex-
perienced (often hometown) courts. A possible answer to this puzzle is 
that lender liability law and the applicable legal standard for transferring 
venue act as deterrents, but future research should consider why Dela-
ware and New York have become the consensus choice when it is not ob-
vious that all of a debtor’s constituencies are best served by the plausible 
benefit of reduced transaction costs.
At this point, forum shopping is a well-established feature of corpo-
rate bankruptcy practice. In other contexts, researchers have used the 
concept of network effects to show how the market’s initial preference 
for a product creates a lock-in effect as the preferred product accrues ben-
efits that increase its value. For example, judicial precedent and expertise 
in Delaware business law make it difficult for other states to compete 
for corporate incorporations because those benefits are not easily dupli-
cated (Klausner 1995). Future research should investigate whether a sim-
ilar process might have happened with bankruptcy courts and whether 
the deference concerns raised by critics might be less pressing in an era 
in which the judges in destination venues have more bargaining power 
than they had in an earlier period. Once a jurisdiction builds up advan-
tages over time, alternatives may not be reasonable substitutes even if 
they would have been in a counterfactual world without extensive forum 
shopping.
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